Introduction: The Potential of the Internet Revisited by Ward, Stephen & Vedel, Thierry
Introduction: The Potential of the Internet Revisited 
BY STEPHEN WARD AND THIERRY VEDEL
The net is the world’s only functioning political anarchy but it
could soon become a major tool for democracy by allowing any-
one anywhere access to information and opinions of anyone else,
anywhere else. A morsel is being given to mankind with one
instruction: ‘Eat Me’, so that we may grow. (Rael A. Fenchurch,
Demos Quarterly, 4, 1994, p. 36)
IN the space of little more than a decade the Internet has moved from
the preserve of computer geeks and academics to becoming a global
media of central concern for political actors and government policy
makers and the public. Barely a day goes by without the Internet being
declared as a panacea to a host of social and political problems or,
alternatively, being held responsible for the promotion of pornography,
racism and terrorism.
As with other technological advances in the twentieth century, the
arrival of the Internet heralded an initial burst of techno-enthusiasm,
with claims that the Internet would revolutionise political systems.1 Part
of this idea was built on a deterministic belief that the Internet is some-
how different from other media and communication tools. Its suppos-
edly unique inherent characteristics including: the lack of editorial
control; its decentralised nature; the speed and volume of information
that could be transferred worldwide; and centrally, the interactive and
networking capacity of technologies would provide solutions to our
rather tired system of representative democracy.
Yet, within five years, a consensus appeared to have developed that the
Internet was being normalised into the traditional political world. Based
on more empirically driven studies, mostly in liberal democracies, sceptics
suggested that the Internet, as with previous technologies, would be
adopted and adapted by mainstream political actors. Far from being a
revolutionary force, some commentators now argued that the already
dominant political forces would use their pre-existing power resources
and advantages to control and neutralise any pluralist tendencies of the
new media.2 Moreover, sceptics pointed out that there was no inherent
reason why the technology should be used for democratic purposes or
politics at all. Indeed, most Internet content is not about politics but sex,
sport and shopping. In just a few years, therefore, the Internet had moved
from a harbinger of a new era of democracy to a mere leisure tool.
This volume assesses some of these claims and issues in the UK con-
text. This introductory piece briefly outlines the growth of the Internet
in the UK and then sets out the main areas of debate in the developing
research agenda over the past decade. The remaining articles then con-
centrate on three key themes:
• Participation and democracy: Using new survey data, di Gennaro
and Dutton’s piece focuses on whether the Internet can attract new
people into the political process and also improve the intensity of
participation? Or whether new technologies merely exacerbate exist-
ing participation divides by providing another communication tool
for the already engaged? Thierry Vedel, Scott Wright, and Ross
Ferguson and Barry Griffiths all deal with different aspects of how
and what the Internet contributes to democracy. Vedel examines the
concept of e-democracy reminding us of its long history predating
the Internet, whilst Wright and Ferguson and Griffiths assess online
consultation exercises, e-voting and blogs as examples of more prac-
tical uses of information communication technologies (ICTs) for
democratic purposes. One of the key questions here is what types of
democracy are emerging online (direct, consumerist, deliberative)
and whether technologies are facilitating new and innovative types
of behaviour or reinforcing and accelerating pre-existing trends
within democracy?
• Institutional and organisational adaptation: Richard Allan’s and
Helen Margett’s articles look at the way that both traditional insti-
tutions such as parliament and government departments have
adapted to the Internet era. By contrast, Jenny Pickerill and Maura
Conway analyse the less institutionalised, outsider organisations and
networks use of ICTs, including radical protest campaigns and ter-
rorist groups. Here we ask whether the Internet, as some argue, is a
tool that has primarily assisted the less hierarchical, less formalised
new social movements (NSMs), global networks and flash cam-
paigns or does cyberspace simply reflect existing institutional power
configurations?
• Governance and regulation of the Internet: Richard Collins exam-
ines the development of a complex system of regulation and control
of the Internet. The key concerns here are whether it is possible to
regulate the Internet successfully and does the new media environ-
ment create a new level of problems distinct from the traditional
media?
The growth of the UK Internet
The Internet began to emerge in the public domain in the UK in 1994
and enter wider public consciousness over the following year. Whilst
the audience at this point was limited largely to elites—government
institutions, many big businesses, large NGOs and the main parties all
created their first web presence in this period. Initial use amongst the
general public at home was restricted by the cost and reliability of Inter-
net access packages and dial-up connections. Even after two to three
years, less than 10% of British public had home access by the 1997 gen-
eral election. Although the rapid growth of e-mail in the workplace
gave an indicator of future levels of activity. 1997–2000 saw the begin-
ning of a period of extensive growth of the Internet. The emergence of
Freeserve in 1998 along with the growing market competitiveness
amongst Internet Service Providers provided significant boost to access
through the reduction of costs.3 By the time of 2001 election, around
one-third of the public had moved online and within a further five years
this had almost doubled again. Some of this expansion is connected
with the general growth of home computers but most notably in homes
where there are school-age children.4
The main change in the last few years has been the rapid development
of broadband which overtook dial-up access for the first time in 2004.
This has allowed users to access the Internet more quickly and exploit
its more sophisticated features notably the audio-visual elements.
Browsing time amongst the UK public has also increased as flat rate
costs and the ‘always on’ feature of broadband make the Internet more
attractive and convenient.
Whilst these figures suggest an inevitable and inexorable growth of
new media technologies, it is worth remembering that the diffusion
rates of previous technologies, including radio, telephone and television,
were much slower. In less than a decade, the Internet has gone from
almost nothing to a mass market. Nevertheless, despite this rapid
growth, the diffusion patterns reveal some persistent divides. Whilst
early adaptors tended to be, unsurprisingly, amongst the elite, middle
class, professional groups, initial divides also opened up between men
and women and young and old. Whilst some of these divides have been
diluted overtime (notably the gender gap), others, especially social class
and age, remain persistent. Indeed, in some cases they even appear to
have widened.5 In 2006, those without access still tend to be amongst the
poor and the elderly. Even where socially disadvantaged groups have
access it often remains unequal in terms of quality. Moreover, recently
rates of growth have slowed and although there is potential for further
growth, there is a significant minority of the UK public (perhaps as large as
20%) who simply have no interest in accessing the Internet, suggesting
that some divides are unlikely to be overcome quickly or easily.
The public, political engagement and the Internet
In the political sphere, at the micro-level, much of the interest in new
ICTs has focused on whether they could stimulate engagement in polit-
ics and more generally change people’s political behaviour and con-
sumption patterns. As we have noted elsewhere, the interest in
participation is not surprising, since the Internet has emerged against a
backdrop of concerns about apparently declining public engagement in
politics, lack of knowledge about politics and heightened levels of scep-
ticism about politicians and mainstream political institutions.6 The
drastic drop in turnout at the 2001 general election provided a catalyst
to those looking for solutions to this apparent crisis of representative
politics, one of which was the use of new media tools.7
The potency of the Internet as means of facilitating engagement has
centred on increasing opportunities to participate, lowering the barriers
to participation and enhancing the quality of the participatory experi-
ence. It has been suggested that new media tools could do all three.
Firstly, the interactive elements of new technologies provide significant
opportunities to create far more channels through which to engage in
the political process. E-mail, blogs, online discussion or consultation
fora all potentially open up new ways to participate and engage. More-
over, one can communicate more directly than in the past without hav-
ing to rely on others (representatives) to articulate your views. In the
short term, it was hoped that both the novelty and the more modern
image of using online methods might attract new participants into the
political process.8
Secondly, it was not just about creating new or different channels of
participation, but how such channels could lower the barriers to, and
increase the quality of, participating. New technologies, such as e-mail
and websites, offer the potential reduction of participatory costs since
at the push of a button, from the comfort of one’s own home, at a time
of your own choosing, it might be possible to take part in political
activity. Searching for information, joining political organisations and
expressing one’s views could all be made easier online. No longer
would it be necessary to have to attend meetings in remote, draughty
town halls on dark winter evenings in order to take part in the political
process. Hence, for the time poor, the housebound and the geogra-
phically remote, Internet-based forms of communication offer significant
gains.
ICTs also potentially lower mobilisation and participation costs in
two other respects: the ability to find and link-up with other individuals
with common interests or concerns. Geography matters much less when
one can communicate with individuals on a global scale and foster and
sustain networks which were previously difficult to create. Addition-
ally, the amount of information readily available to those with access to
the Internet has been significantly expanded. Arguably, since there
tends to be a positive correlation between exposure to increased media,
news and information, ICTs could potentially create further socialisa-
tion and stimulate additional political activity.9
Although mass survey evidence testing of such assumptions is still
relatively limited and fragmented in the UK, the consensus amongst
most of the large studies in 2005 indicates a fairly narrow impact.10 In
particular, the main surveys suggest the following broad trends: First,
relatively small numbers are involved in active online politics (joining
organisations online, signing e-petitions, taking part in online discus-
sion, etc.), suggesting that between two and eight percent of the online
population (one to five percent of the overall population) are actively
engaged. However, significantly more use the Internet for news and
information gathering—up to a quarter of the British public now use
online sources for news and current affairs.
Secondly, the profile of online participants is not significantly differ-
ent from traditional activists. In other words, those that participate
offline, tend to dominate online political engagement as well.11 The
stereotypical profile of an online participant is more likely to be an
urban-based, middle class, male who is already highly politically
engaged. Nor is activity online necessarily novel and different. People
tend to use the Internet to supplement their offline behaviour and use
online sources with which they are familiar with in the offline world.
The BBC online, for example, dwarfs any other news and information
source in the UK.
Overall, much of the survey evidence suggests a reinforcement effect,
if not the possibility of exacerbating existing political divides, whereby
those that gain the most through online access and engagement are
those who are already powerful and already politically active, whilst
those disadvantaged offline remain silent online.12 Although some now
even doubt that the Internet encourages or stimulates political activity
even amongst those predisposed towards political activity.13
Nevertheless, the evidence is not absolutely clear-cut. There are also
indications from UK data that the potential for online mobilisation and
engagement remains in some contexts. ICTs have clearly played a useful
role in mobilising and organising one-off protests, demonstrations and
events. Protests as diverse as Countryside Alliance’s march on London
to Anti-Iraq war protest have seen considerable online mobilisation
efforts, although it is more difficult to know whether this one-off activ-
ity has led to sustained involvement.14 As Pickerill’s article suggests, one
of the growth areas of political campaigning has been global protest.
Whilst this is not new, the Internet appears to be accelerating the glo-
balisation of political and social protest. Thus the large-scale anti-
globalisation rallies, Make Poverty History and Live 8 campaigns have
all been Internet assisted.
A further area of debate is the potential to engage young people
online. As di Gennaro and Dutton note in this volume, some survey
evidence points to the disproportionate engagement of young people via
new technologies, at least superficially. At one level, this is no surprise
since young people have generally grown up with the technology as part
of their everyday experiences and have access to the Internet via the
education system. Both Gibson et al. and Lusoli and Ward found small
indications that ICTs are being used by young people who were not
previously political active—especially among higher and further educa-
tion students.15 However, other studies indicate more limited long-term
impacts. Livingstone’s comprehensive work on children and young
people suggests that whilst new technologies are increasingly used for
civic purposes by some (particularly older teenage girls), they are
unlikely to change the overall patterns of young people’s participation
in politics.16 Norris and Curtice go even further, from their survey data
they found no evidence that access to the Internet makes the young
more likely to be politically active.17
All this highlights the fact that the Internet per se is unlikely to stimu-
late widespread mobilisation or participation, but maybe important in
certain organisational and issue contexts. This continues to underline
the importance of political organisations and social networks as
important mobilising factors rather than technology alone. Many
people won’t participate unless asked to do so and are interested on
issue basis rather than in politics generally. Nevertheless, as Norris and
Curtice point out, ‘even if the Internet does not result in more people
becoming politically active, it could still have important consequences if
it makes the political activity that does take place more effective’.18
Representative institutions, organisations and the Internet?
At the organisational level, there have also been similar predictions
about the potential impact of ICTs to foster radical change. Here, the
debate has tended to focus on the ability of ICTs to facilitate new
organisational forms, new internal dynamics and a shift in the balance
of power between organisations.
CREATING NEW ORGANISATIONAL FORMS? Much interest has focussed
on the potential to create new types of campaigns, networks and vir-
tual structures online. Theoretically, it is no longer necessary for an
organisation to maintain a physical infrastructure. New organisations
could simply operate from cyberspace using electronic communication
to recruit supporters, debate and organise, whilst traditional institu-
tions and organisations could become leaner and increasingly virtual.
Yet, whilst UK parties and trade unions have dabbled with the idea of
virtual structures, traditional mainstream organisations have generally
been slow to exploit this potential and have tended to maintain their
traditional organisational forms alongside any virtual structures.19
Although there was much hype surrounding the creation of virtual
trade union branches, for example, these have remained largely
embryonic.
However, different types of Internet-based groups have emerged. As
both Margetts and Allan point out here, one type of virtual organisa-
tion that is becoming increasingly prominent are those providing pub-
lic information or reinterpreting government or official information.
One model is the My Society initiative (www.mysociety.org) which is
a virtual charitable organisation dedicated to building websites to
improve civic and community life including: www.writetothem.com,
www.theyworkforyou.com and www.hearfromyourmp.com, all aimed
at connecting people to their parliamentary representatives.20 Sites
such as these provide a vast amount of accessible material on govern-
ment and politicians and also provide easier direct route to contacting
representatives.
Other new virtual actors include the growth of blog campaigns.
Although the UK blogsphere is newer, less well developed and has had
far less impact than in the US, socio-political blogs (online news-current
affairs or campaign diaries) are becoming increasingly popular. So far
though, many UK blogs, as Ferguson and Griffiths argue here, often do
little more than recycle news from the mainstream media rather than
operating campaigns as such. A growing number are monitoring the
activities of political representatives (e.g. Online Parliamentarian—
incunabula.typepad.com/parliament/—dedicated to covering e-democracy
issues in the Scottish Parliament) organisations and institutions such as
traditional media outlets (e.g. the Daily Mail—www.mailwatch.co.uk
or the BBC—biased-bbc.blogspot.com/). A smaller group such as
www.bloggerheads.com are, however, running political campaigns and
sometimes mobilising people on a diverse range of issues. Iraq and the
war on terror in particular have created considerable interest from blog-
gers. Many of these online campaigns, networks and blogs are relatively
short-lived flash phenomena, but interestingly some of these campaigns
are highly flexible and adaptable. So as one issue campaign disappears,
the network can lie dormant but re-emerge months later under a differ-
ent guise or title on a different issue quickly reactivating earlier links.
For example, the ‘hands up for peace’ network aimed at mobilising
school children against the Iraq War originated, in part, out of an earl-
ier online campaign around the sustainable development summit in
Johannesburg.
INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING–REDUCING HIERARCHIES? As well as
potentially allowing new organisational forms, one area of debate has
been how far the Internet might internally restructure organisations/
institutions. Much has been made of the democratising influence of new
technologies, that they can resist the iron law of oligarchy and institu-
tionalisation to produce more flexible grassroots decentralised style of
organisation (see both Pickerill and Conway in this volume). This was
based on the ability of ICTs to alter both the vertical relationship
between members/supporters and elites and also horizontal member-to-
member relationships.21 In the case of the former, it has been argued
that the creation of intranets and internal online discussion fora, e-mail
lists and the like, might make leaders more accountable to members and
grassroots supporters. Through ICTs members can have more frequent
and direct access to elites to communicate their opinions. Equally, web-
sites might be used to provide more information and more open forms
of decision-making that would improve both the accountability and
transparency of elite level decision-making. In terms of horizontal rela-
tionships, new ICTs potentially allow members, supporters and
internal groups to communicate and network more effectively with one
another without the need to go through official channels or organisa-
tional headquarters. Furthermore, the lack of control structures within
the Internet mean that it is harder for organisational elites to control
internal flows of information and even dissent. Consequently, poten-
tially it makes it easier to challenge elites from below. The recent anti-
Charles Kennedy website and e-petition (www.kennedymustgo.com)
set up by disaffected Liberal Democrat supporters aimed at pressuring
Kennedy to resign as Liberal Democrat leader might be indicative of a
future trend.
Underlying such claims are normative assumptions that flattening
hierarchies will increase the power of grassroots members and create a
more participatory form of internal democracy. Sceptics, however,
have subsequently questioned whether technologies are really likely to
facilitate such unidirectional changes. Simply providing electronic tools
for participation is not the same as actually empowering members. The
participatory context is clearly important—who controls the agenda
for electronic discussion? What are the rules for access? How do the
existing rules of an organisation incorporate electronic channels? And
is participation viewed as important? Several studies have indicated
that because of the resource and power advantages existing elites and
organisational headquarters are more likely to dominate the e-agenda
and use it to strengthen their position of power. For example, Pickerill’s
study of Friends of the Earth (FoE) UK suggests that whilst ICTs
offered a challenge to FoE’s hierarchy, its overall effect was to maintain
and reinforce vertical hierarchies.22 At a basic level, beyond the head-
quarters of many parties, trade unions and pressure groups, branch/
local level access and use of new ICTs is far more patchy.23 Others have
questioned how far ICTs will strengthen collective grassroots activist
structures.24 Aside from whether virtual networks can engender the
same levels of activity and participation, it is possible that ICTs may
lead to a strengthening of the vertical relations between organisational
elites and individual members but have limited impact on the horizon-
tal level. Hence, if organisational leaders take a proactive stance with
ICTs they can use it to bypass collective grassroots activist structures
and appeal directly for support from the wider often more passive
membership. In short, therefore, it is not yet clear that any particular
model of internal democracy is favoured by the adoption of ICTs,
much is clearly dependent on the pre-existing ethos of the organisation
in question.
ACCELERATING ORGANISATIONAL PLURALISM? It is not simply within
organisations/institutions that ICTs might impact but perhaps more
fundamentally some have argued that the Internet might shift the bal-
ance of power between organisations and institutions. Debate has
tended to crystallise around ideas of accelerated pluralism and equalisa-
tion on the one hand, or a normalisation process minimising change on
the other. Notions of accelerated pluralism and equalising the commu-
nications playing field indicate that outsider, oppositional or fringe
organisations are likely to benefit disproportionately from the rise of
new ICTs and potentially pose more of a challenge to mainstream polit-
ical establishment.25 The idea of new media technologies supporting a
more pluralistic environment rests on: Firstly, the lowering of commu-
nication costs—compared to the traditional media, the Internet is a
cheap and open publishing source where obscure websites from the
political fringe can sit alongside the establishment. Secondly, the Inter-
net also theoretically increases the communication reach of outsider
organisations. Whereas television and newspapers have limited space
and editors can edit out fringe concerns, the Internet provides an unlim-
ited platform with which to get one’s message across; Thirdly, precisely
because of the low costs and the lack of editorial control, small and
fringe organisations can create an impression of legitimacy and appear
more credible in cyberspace than they actually are in reality. It is diffi-
cult for a web surfer to gauge the size, legitimacy or authenticity of
organisations by simply looking at a website; Fourthly, it has been sug-
gested that the original, anarchic, decentralised nature of the Internet
with free flows of information and a common space, relatively unregu-
lated by governments benefits flexible, non-hierarchical types of organi-
sation outside the mainstream such as direct action protest campaigns,
anarchistic and libertarian networks whose values are supposedly best
reflected in cyberspace.26
The idea of equalisation or accelerated pluralism has been increas-
ingly challenged. Resnick argues, that although originally a playground
for the alternative and anarchic increasingly the Internet has been nor-
malised.27 In the political sphere this means that the large traditional
political forces will come to predominate as they do in other media.
This normalisation thesis argues that the increasing commercialisation
and professionalisation of cyberspace has squeezed the space for altern-
ative politics.28 Far from being a cost-free exercise, sophisticated new
media campaigning involves considerable investment of both time and
money. Smaller volunteer-run or amateur activist organisations are
unlikely to be able to match their professionalised counterparts since
they are reliant on the goodwill of members or supporters who often
lack the time and skills to manage web-campaigns on a continuous
basis. Furthermore, Hindman et al’s research in the US indicates that
search engines have a tendency to promote links to a relatively small
number of political sites resulting in these organisations having a much
higher online profile. Far from diversifying sources of information and
creating a more pluralistic environment the world wide web (WWW)
promotes a winner takes all culture.29
Normalisers have also argued that because the Internet is a pull tech-
nology, political organisations are reliant on citizens having enough
prior interest to visit their sites and the technology alone will not create
such interest. This has led Norris to argue that party websites, for
example, largely preach to the already converted i.e. supporters and
sympathisers of existing organisations rather than reaching the uncon-
verted or the politically uninterested.30 Moreover, the Internet has con-
tributed to further fragmentation of the media that presents the
consumer with theoretically more choice but means that they can
choose not to be exposed to politics.31 With web portals and digital
television packages citizens can easily ignore politics. Whereas, with
traditional terrestrial broadcasting the public is regularly exposed to
political news even if only as passive consumers.
Finally, whilst the Internet is often depicted as an uncontrolled and
uncontrollable platform for the radical and the extreme, it is clear that
governments and established interests are devoting increasing amounts
of time to trying to regulate and control the Internet (see Collins this
issue). As both Pickerill and Conway remind us in this volume, increas-
ing attempts have been made to restrict and monitor the online activi-
ties of a range of protest campaigns and terrorist or crime networks.
So far, changes in the organisational and institutional structure of UK
politics are somewhat mixed. Whilst the Internet has become a key
organisational and administrative necessity it has not revolutionised
internal structures. Nor has it significantly upset the balance of power
between organisations. It’s difficult to think of a political equivalent to
eBay or Amazon. Nevertheless, ICTs have undoubtedly lowered the
start-up costs for campaigns and are facilitating the growth of new net-
works and organisations allowing them to operate in ways that weren’t
previously possible. In short, as Ward et al argue the Internet is widen-
ing the political playing field and also accelerating established trends
such as growth of direct action protest, single-issue politics that predate
the arrival of the Internet.32 Whilst new technologies have not revolu-
tionised or destroyed traditional representative institutions or collective
organisations they have benefited less than NSMs, protest campaigns
and flexible, decentralised networks.
Lagging behind?
Compared with changes in other fields, such as business or social sector
organisations, the traditional mainstream political sphere has been rela-
tively cautious and conservative in its approach towards new technolo-
gies. ICTs are often still used as one-way, top-down communication
tools by government and representatives replicating their traditional
broadcast communication patterns. The unwillingness of mainstream
political organisations to use new media creatively is perhaps under-
standable and stems from a number of factors:
The institutional fragmentation of government and parliament is not
necessarily conducive to fostering a coherent approach to information
technology (IT). IT tends to cross-cut the traditional bureaucratic sec-
torisation of Westminster and Whitehall leading to a lack of ownership
and leadership. As Allan’s article reveals, in Parliament, for example,
there is a high degree of division and also individualisation. Many com-
plain of a lack of corporate culture in Westminster and a struggle to
foster a collective identity because, parliaments essentially comprise
individualised small businesses (MPs’ offices) each doing their own
thing. Fragmentation is compounded by the poor reputation that IT has
within government and parliament. As Margetts notes, the experiences
of many government departments with IT projects have often been
extremely difficult. Such experiences often lead to a latent technophobia
that runs through many political institutions. In part, it also reflects the
wider culture of politicians (very few of whom have any IT back-
ground), who operate and win promotion through a very traditional
partisan, adversarial, face-to-face culture. From local party meetings,
parliamentary debates and doorstep canvassing, most UK politicians
are still wedded to the adversarial cut and thrust style of politics. Politi-
cians often seem to believe that there is little demand for ICT within the
political system or that ICTs attract the wrong sort of people—cranks,
spammers, single-issue fanatics and the already privileged middle
class.33 Overall, the result is often a fear factor within mainstream insti-
tutions. For parties, parliaments and government departments, their IT
failures produce unwelcome publicity and are scrutinised in a way that
does not apply to the less institutionalised parts of the political world
such as NSMs, consequently they have more to lose. Not surprisingly,
given the track record of government, there is a fear of making mistakes
that has engendered a cautious approach to technology.
Democracy and the Internet revisited
At the systemic level, the nature of the argument has focussed on how
ICTs might impact on the democratic system. Much of the initial dis-
cussion centred on two rather sterile debates, direct versus representative
democracy and e-democracy/cyberdemocracy versus techno-populism. In
part, this is not entirely surprising given the apparently increasing prob-
lems of 19th century style representative parliamentary and party based
democracy. The apparent unpopularity of the institutions of representa-
tive democracy and lack of trust in representatives meant that there was
a ready-made audience looking for solutions. The rise of new media
technologies appeared to offer an alternative route for both direct
democracy enthusiasts and politicians alike. Peter Mandelson’s well-pub-
licised comments about technology contributing to the end of the sys-
tem of pure representative democracy is a good example of this.34
The most radical and often speculative scenarios to emerge from
early accounts was the idea that the Internet could hasten the demise of
traditional representative democracy by producing a process of deinsti-
tutionalisation and disintermediation as organisational hierarchies
are flattened and displaced by direct input from citizens.35 At its most
revolutionary, a return to the classical model of unmediated direct
democracy was envisaged where new technologies allow for much
more regular and direct input from individuals. E-polling, e-voting and
e-referenda all make it significantly more possible for citizens to have a
direct say in governing themselves bypassing traditional mediating insti-
tutions and organisations such as parties, pressure groups and parlia-
ments. Negroponte even discusses the possible end of the political
nation state as technologies undermine geographical boundaries.36 In
short, the organisation and administration of direct democracy in a
mass system was no longer untenable. Obviously, given the revolution-
ary nature of change envisaged here the operational detail of direct
democracy has been less than precise. Whilst practical details are some-
what limited, one-dimensional normative debates about the benefits or
drawbacks of direct democracy have flourished. While proponents see
technology-enhanced direct democracy producing a new more respon-
sive system of governance replacing the outmoded organisations and
rules of a pre-modern era, critics point to the possible rise of electronic
populism or demagoguery open to abuse and manipulation.37
Aside from whether direct democracy would be a beneficial develop-
ment, the idea of removal of political organisational framework seems
fanciful for several reasons. An unwritten assumption in these types of
accounts is the inability of political organisations to withstand the tide
of technological change. Yet, as historical studies of the arrival of previ-
ous technologies remind us, most organisations tend to adapt and adopt
the technology. Additionally, proponents of direct democracy underesti-
mate the extent to which people wish to participate on individual basis.
Citizens may lack time, skills, resources and interest to be involved on
the scale required. They may also derive tangible psychological benefits
from participating collectively. Hence, even if the technology is available
some citizens may prefer to see experts and professionals in pressure
groups carry out participation for them or wish to participate collec-
tively themselves. Even in more direct forms of democracy, as Budge
points out, the aggregating function of political parties could still be of
prime importance for assisting citizens to make choices.38
Recently, more nuanced arguments have begun to emerge that move
away from simple dichotomies between representative and direct demo-
cracy. Stephen Coleman has written extensively about the potential of
the new technologies to facilitate a reshaping of representative demo-
cracy and of representation itself rather than its replacement. Coleman
suggests that new media tools (although not simply ICTs alone) could
help create a form of direct representation.39 Here new technologies are
not used simply for balloting or polling or irregular consultations but
are used to form the basis of an ongoing conversational dialogue and
deliberative discussion between citizens and their representatives, where
citizens are engaged in the policy process as equals rather than being
tolerated or patronised. This is more, he argues, than simply reconnect-
ing people to the current processes of representation, which would be
unlikely to work, but ultimately about changing the longer term culture
of both representatives and represented promoting more efficacy and
mutual understanding.
So far much of the empirically guided work in the UK indicates that
the dominant trend towards new media amongst government and repre-
sentatives has been a relatively limited modernisation approach, largely
trying to maintain existing practices and relations but in new formats
(see Wright, Allan, and Ferguson and Griffiths this volume). Examining
e-government and e-democracy initiatives, some have argued that what
has emerged is a form of thin, consumerist style democracy. Here ICTs
are being used primarily to improve the efficiency of government serv-
ices and citizens are regarded as consumers with a relatively narrow set
of rights concentrating on the low politics of service delivery. In
essence, ICTs are being used by government to continue trends in public
service reform begun in the 1980s.40 However, this alone is unlikely to
help representatives or satisfy the public, without an effort to harness
technologies and develop new ways of working, new styles of commu-
nication and wider political reforms. In the short term, at least, it
appears that we are entering a period of what might be termed ‘difficult
democracy’,41 where ICTs might provide increased openness, informa-
tion and access (for some), but this in turn places strains and pressures
on a democratic representative system which was originally developed
around nineteenth- and early twentieth-century politics. We can iden-
tify five key pressures on the democratic system heightened by the Inter-
net era: (1) Disaggregation and acceleration—as we have noted above,
ICTs are particularly good at promoting flash mobilisation and protest
and oppositional politics based around individual issues. For represent-
atives, ICTs appear to create more noise and chaos in which politicians
have to aggregate and distinguish key issues; (2) The amplification of
voices of those already engaged and active in politics. There is a danger
that ICTs will merely perpetuate and in some cases exacerbate pre-
existing participatory divisions;42 (3) Fragmentation of representation—
the amplification effect is then further underpinned by the fragmenta-
tion of online provision by representatives and government. As we
noted above, those in highly wired area (often middle class urban and
wealthy) have a better levels of access and representation than those
who perhaps most require it;43 (4) Raised expectations—the public have
significant expectations of online activity from representatives and rep-
resentative institutions but little understanding of the formal processes
or restraints under which governments and MPs operate. Again, the risk
is that ICTs will heighten dissatisfaction if representatives fail to
respond or continue with existing practice; (5) Growing distance between
formal and informal democracy—replicating existing practice is likely
to further intensify the divide between an increasingly vibrant informal
DIY network style of politics which is assisted by new media tools and
the formal system of representative democracy which is increasingly
ignored, misunderstood and often seen as irrelevant.
None of this is of course pre-determined. Technologies do not drive
one particular route or type of democracy. The potential for ICT
assisted reinvigoration and opportunities for innovation as described by
Coleman remains. In part, this is because ‘modernisation without
democratisation’ is unlikely to work. Neither the public nor representa-
tives are likely to be satisfied by such an approach and pressure for
alternative solutions are likely to grow in the long term.
Conclusions
At one level, the changes facilitated by ICTs so far and the response of
the political sphere look modest particularly compared to other sectors.
This might lead one to conclude that the Internet is of limited conse-
quence for democratic politics. However, we would argue there is dan-
ger of underestimating the ongoing changes in digital era. Often the
way the debate has been defined has not assisted understanding of the
interplay between politics and new technologies. The main problems
include:
• The overhyping of new technologies which framed much of the initial
debates has been unhelpful to the subsequent analysis. To under-
stand the role of technologies we need to move away from all
encompassing debates about good Internet–bad Internet or separat-
ing the Internet from other technologies and more broadly the polit-
ical, economic and social realities that frame uses of technologies.
• Unhelpful comparisons: There has been a consistent trend to com-
pare the UK unfavourably with the US or see the US as a model for
future developments in the UK. Whilst it is tempting to do this, it is
not necessarily helpful. One example illustrates the problem of look-
ing for irrelevant comparisons. Much excitement was created during
2005 election campaign by looking for the British equivalent of the
Howard Dean campaign and then subsequent disappointment not to
find one. Yet this ignores the central role of the UK social, political
and media environments in shaping the use of technology in different
ways to the US. Indeed, one might argue that aspects of the British
system actually downplay the role of ICTs in areas such as traditional
political campaigning. The UK’s well-entrenched party-centred sys-
tem with constituency campaigning based on comparatively small
geographic areas means that the old techniques of doorstep canvass-
ing and face-to-face contact are more valuable than e-campaigns.44
• Narrow definitions and measurement: It maybe that we need to
extend or move beyond our traditional definitions of what consti-
tutes the political. Technologies could be extending the nature of
political activity and debate. The growth of viral online satire and
political humour is one area that is worthy of further exploration.
We also need to consider the knock-on effects of expectations and
pressures from outside the traditional political sphere. As Margetts
notes, people’s relations with a range of other institutions have
changed significantly over the last decade. One question might be
how far changes in other areas of people’s lifestyles and social inter-
actions eventually reshape their expectations of government and the
political system generally.
• Early days: Finally, it’s important to remember that in many respects
we have barely started and that technology is evolving rapidly. Nor
do we necessarily yet have the consistent long-term research evid-
ence or research tools to understand the impact of new ICTs. Ana-
lysing the role of television in the 1950s, some 30 years after it first
emerged, would have underestimated its eventual impact. In many
ways, the Internet, at the end of its first decade, has already become
more ubiquitous and arguably more influential.
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